A  major Canadian research initiative is giving turkey producers new insights into how highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) spreads – and what they can do to better protect their farms without harming the environment.

Scientists from Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) and Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) are leading this three-pronged research project to identify how HPAI is spreading, what role wildlife plays in this spread, and what steps producers can take to reduce on-farm risk.

Since 2022, HPAI outbreaks  have had a devastating impact not only on domestic poultry but also on wild bird populations. And for turkey producers, who tend to be overrepresented in infection numbers, that has meant heightened concern and need for clearer guidance on how to minimize risk. 

Understanding the environmental piece

Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) research scientist Dr. Jennifer Provencher is co-leading a team from her agency and Carleton University, including students, studying how biodiversity and landscape features may be contributing to HPAI outbreaks. Until recently, most biosecurity measures focused on human activity and farm-to-farm interactions. But with HPAI now entrenched in wild bird populations, Provencher says it’s time to expand the biosecurity lens. 

“What’s changed is the scale and impact of this virus on wild birds,” she says. “We’re seeing wild and migratory bird mortality events across Canada – dead seabirds on beaches, dead geese in the Prairies – which is why Environment and Climate Change Canada are now involved with a whole response team to look at how HPAI transmits across the landscape.” 

In the past, Avian Influenza transmission into poultry flocks has been linked to wetlands or and the presence of wild bird populations – such as barn swallows for example, but Provencher notes there’s no real evidence to suggest these links actually exist or are behind on-farm infections.  

The team has been working with 30 to 40 Ontario farms – some infected and some not – to examine which wildlife species are visiting farms and how they might be contributing to virus spread. Using song meters and trail cameras, they’ve captured footage of coyotes, turkey vultures, and red-tailed hawks scavenging deadstock piles and compost areas.

Their findings could prompt a rethink on how producers manage compost piles and disposal areas, for example. 

“We’ve seen farms surrounded by wetlands and forests that haven’t had a single case, and others in less diverse landscapes that have been hit,” says Provencher. “It’s not just about how many wild birds are around – it’s also about who else is around and what they’re doing in the landscape that could be behind transmission.”

Importantly, early results of data analysis from southern Ontario and Quebec suggest that landscape-level risk is mostly local. Variables at the 500-metre level (like adjacent crop type or tree cover) were more influential than those at two or 10 kilometres. That means farmers have more control than they may think when it comes to reducing risk.

A closer look at biosecurity

While Provencher is examining the broader environment, veterinary epidemiologist Dr. Manon Racicot from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is zooming in on farm-level biosecurity and what can be learned from farms who’ve had HPAI infections. Working with Dr. JP Vaillancourt at Université de Montréal, Racicot launched a case-control study in Quebec – later expanded to Ontario by Al Dam of the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agri-Business – to compare biosecurity practices on infected versus non-infected turkey farms. The goal: identify practical, evidence-based risk factors.

Key findings so far include several on-farm practices that appear to increase vulnerability. One is unprotected bedding storage. Farms that stored
bedding outside or with exposure to wild birds were more likely to be infected. 

Even the process of bringing clean bedding into the barn matters – tractor wheels can unknowingly carry the virus inside, for example.

Another concern is split shipments to processing. When birds are shipped in multiple loads over several days, the risk of exposure increases – especially during migration season. Biosecurity breaches during catching are potential transmission windows for birds remaining in the barn.

Outdoor bird movement has also emerged as a factor. Farms that moved poults between barns using outdoor equipment were more exposed. Even without direct bird contact, equipment moving between barns can carry contamination.

Finally, practices around deadstock and composting play a role. Ontario farms, which primarily use on-site composting instead of rendering services, may be inadvertently attracting scavengers that carry HPAI. 

In contrast, Quebec farms using rendering trucks collecting deadstock away from barns and closer to the road saw reduced risk.

“We’re not saying you have to change everything overnight,” says Racicot. “But small changes – like moving your compost away from the barn, composting in a closed shed or improving entryway design – can make a difference in protecting your flock against HPAI.”

Moving forward: what this means for producers

Although full analysis and final recommendations won’t be ready until this fall, both Provencher and Racicot say early findings already offer useful guidance that farmers can implement.

One key takeaway is to reinforce “double bubble” biosecurity. That means keeping strict farm-to-farm protocols but also paying attention to wildlife access to barns and compost or other vulnerable areas.

Another suggestion is to think local. Producers should focus mitigation efforts within 500 metres of their barns and adjust practices based on the actual species showing up on farms rather than just the presence of wetland or forest nearby.

Securing bedding and deadstock is also important. Farmers should protect storage areas from wild birds and manage dead piles in a way that avoids attracting scavengers.

Finally, producers are encouraged to rethink infrastructure. 

If upgrading barns or entryways, they should design with biosecurity in mind. Barriers can make it easier to stick to hygiene protocols.

A major goal this fall will be to bring all the data – biodiversity, biosecurity, and farm design – into a single workshop to create practical, science-based recommendations.

“We’re going to bring together diverse experts who look at things in different ways and see what that tells us, and how we can make evidence-informed decisions that will work for both farms and the environment,” Provencher says.

Key takeaways at a glance

Top risks identified:

• Split processing loads: Avoid multi-day shipping whenever possible. 90 per cent of farms in the control group were shipping in a single step, compared to only 65 per cent of infected farms. 
• Unprotected bedding and compost piles: Keep unused bedding supplies dry and inaccessible to wild birds and manage deadstock to reduce visits from scavengers. Coyotes, turkey vultures, and red-tailed hawks frequently visit compost piles.

Sometimes it’s not what you think:

• Some of the most biodiverse farms studied had no infections – showing that risk depends on presence of specific wildlife species, not just the general presence of wildlife.

How you can act:

• Improve compost and deadstock area security.
• Rethink barn entryways for better biosecurity compliance.
• Focus risk reduction within 500 m of barns.

This research is funded by a broad coalition of organizations, including Canadian Food Inspection Agency; Environment and Climate Change Canada; Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Agribusiness; Université de Montréal; Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l’Alimentation du Québec; University of Guelph; and other provincial and national partners.